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John Paul Jones *
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INTRODUCTION
What follows is, first, a report of certain developments during
the last two years in the administrative law of Virginia, in par-
ticular the law governing rulemaking by state agencies and judi-
cial review of both rules and cases from state agencies and, se-
cond, a report of developments in the law relating to Virginia's
Freedom of Information Act.
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN VIRGINIA'S LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
A. Rulemaking
1. Regulating Abortion Clinics as the General Assembly Has
Directed
Much drama played out last year in the Virginia Board of
Health (the "Board") as a result of legislation directing it to regu-
late abortion clinics as hospitals rather than as outpatient surgi-
cal facilities, as had been its want when left previously to its own
discretion. Conflicting opinions about just how far the new law
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derogated Board discretion divided its members and, for a while,
put the Board in opposition to both the Health Department's staff
and the attorney general. The brouhaha raised substantial and
troublesome questions of statutory construction and constitution-
al government by rule of law. For now, they remain unresolved.
In Virginia's Health Code, the General Assembly has delegated
to the Board power generally to make regulations having force of
law "as may be necessary" for the administration of the Health
Code and any other laws assigned to the Board, the department,
or the commissioner for administration.1 The Board also is explic-
itly authorized to provide variances and make exceptions from its
regulations, provided that they are "reasonable. '2 But the matter
of health regulation is not left there by the legislature. Title 32.1
is replete with provisions in which the General Assembly has
preempted the Board from the exercise of its discretion as to what
may be necessary. In chapter 5, the legislature dictates its own
rules for the operation of health care facilities it classifies as hos-
pitals, nursing homes, hospices, and certified nursing facilities.'
Thus, it has not been left to the Board to find necessary, for ex-
ample, the inspection of these premises for asbestos; the General
Assembly has arrogated for itself that judgment and enacted law
accordingly.4 In the same fashion, the General Assembly has pro-
vided its own exception from doctors' prescriptions for certain
vaccinations, authorizing their administration pursuant to a
standing order instead.5 The General Assembly might have
shared its lawmaking power with the Board, but it has evidently
reserved for itself both the first and the last words on regulatory
matters otherwise assigned to the Board. Nothing about this
scheme of legislative delegation is novel; indeed, it may be re-
garded as obedient to constitutional imperative.6
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-12 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
2. Id.; see generally Sean D. Croston, An Important Member of the Family: The Role
of Regulatory Exemptions in Administrative Procedure, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 295 (2012).
3. See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-123 to -162.15 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp.
2012).
4. See id. § 32.1-126.1 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
5. See id. § 32.1-126.4 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
6. Cf. Winchester & Strasburg R.R. v. Commonwealth, 106 Va. 264, 268, 55 S.E. 692,
693 (1906) ("[T]he whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments, but that
either department may exercise the powers of another to a limited extent."), quoted in
Baliles v. Mazur, 224 Va. 462, 471-72, 297 S.E.2d 695, 700 (1982); see also 1981-82 Op.
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In 2011, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 924 ("Bill
924"), amending Virginia Code section 32.1-127.7 In that section
of the Health Code, the legislature has set forth a number of mat-
ters in which it has cabined the otherwise broad authority of the
Board to license medical facilities and set conditions for the issue
or retention of such licenses.8 Bill 924 directed the Board to classi-
fy any facility performing five or more first-trimester abortions
per month as a category of hospital and dictated application to
such facilities of standards for construction, maintenance, opera-
tion, staffing, equipping, staff qualifications and training, and
conditions under which services may be provided, as well as re-
quirements for policies related to infection prevention, disaster
preparedness, and facility security applied to hospitals, nursing
homes, and certified nursing facilities.' The legislature did not
itself set any of these standards, but left the Board to articulate
them with reference to models "established and recognized by
medical and health care professionals and by specialists in mat-
ters of public health and safety."" Thus, the Board is not afforded
its own blank slate for standard writing but instead obliged to
avail itself of standards created and embraced by appropriate ex-
perts.
Hitherto, the Board had defined outpatient hospitals as facili-
ties offering surgical procedures "in a medical environment ex-
ceeding the normal capability found in a physician's office," but
without hospitalization, and treated "outpatient abortion clinics"
as members of this class. 2 This approach left open a question of
whether facilities not offering surgical abortions were covered.3
Va. Att'y Gen. 93, 93-94.
7. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 670, 2011 Va. Acts 1092, 1093 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127 (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
8. See id.
9. In Virginia, abortions after the first trimester must be performed in hospitals. See
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-73 to -74 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
10. S.B. 924, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as ch. 670, 2011 Va. Acts.
at 1093).
11. Ch. 670, 2011 Va. Acts. at 1093.
12. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-410-10 (2010).
13. Such abortions are also called "medication abortions." See The Abortion Pill (Med-
ication Abortion), PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health.
topics/abortionlabortion-pill-medication.abortion-4354.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). The
Planned Parenthood protocol for a non-surgical abortion calls for administration of one
drug, mifepristone, at a clinic, but for self-administration of the second drug, misoprostol,
as much as three days later at a location agreeable to health care provider and patient. Id.
Mifepristone is said to inhibit production of progesterone, leaving the uterus to break
2012]
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The General Assembly supplied the answer in Bill 924, mandat-
ing that facilities be treated as hospitals if, in a month, they host
five or more first-trimester abortions.14 Because Bill 924 does not
distinguish surgical abortions from non-surgical, application of
ordinary rules for the construction of statutes should lead to the
conclusion that both sorts have been addressed.'5 Thus, one result
of Bill 924 was foreclosure for the Board of the option of exempt-
ing facilities offering only non-surgical, i.e., pharmaceutical abor-
tions. The words of the statute simply leave no room for such ex-
emption. Such was the advice of the Board's legal expert, a senior
assistant attorney general, 6 and such was the Board's conclusion
as expressed in an agency statement of September 19, 2011.'"
But what Bill 924 did not take away remains. According to the
statute, abortion clinics of the sort described "shall be classified
as a category of 'hospital.'"''2 The natural inference to be drawn
from such wording is that, with regard to regulation, "hospital" is
a class presumed by the General Assembly to permit more than
one category. Thus, even after Bill 924, the Board ought to be
found authorized to regulate abortion clinics as a category of hos-
pital distinct from other categories of hospital (as well as from
nursing homes and certified nursing facilities). The Board may
have lost the discretion to exempt any abortion clinic, but it has
down. Id. Misoprostol causes the uterus to empty. Id. The Planned Parenthood protocol
appears to be typical. Compare id., with Medical Abortion, UCSF MED. CTR., http:/www.
ucsfhealth.org/treatmentsmedical_abortion/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012), and The Abortion
Pill: Medical Abortion with Mifepristone and Misoprostol, FEMINIST WOMEN'S HEALTH
CTR., http://www.fwhc.org/abortion/medical-ab.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012), and Mife-
pristone, REPROD. HEALTH TECHS. PROJECT, http://www.rhtp.org/abortion/mifepristone/
default.asp#q2 (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). Yet to be determined is where, for the purposes
of Bill 924, such an abortion is "performed."
14. S.B. 924.
15. See EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 189 (1940) (footnotes
omitted) ("It is also a basic rule of construction that general words should be given a gen-
eral construction; that is, they should be given their full and natural meaning, unless the
statute in some manner reveals that the legislative intent was otherwise."); see also REED
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 200 (1975); ANTONIN
SCALTA & BRYAN A. GARDNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 101
(2012); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBlE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47:7 (7th ed. 2007).
16. STATE BD. OF HEALTH MINUTES 14 (Sept. 15, 2011), www.vdh.virginia.gov/Admini
stration/meetings/documents/2011/pdf/Minutes%2OSeptember%2015%202011.pdf.
17. See VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Regulations for Licensure of Abortion Facilities 3, 7, in
VIRGINIA REGULATORY TOWN HALL (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.townhall.virginia.gov/1/
GetFile.cfm?File=C:%5CTownHall% 5Cdocroot%5C58%5C3563%5C6006%5CagencyState
ment_VDH-6006_v6.pdf.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2011) (emphasis added).
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not lost the discretion to regulate them differently. Bill 924 leaves
the Board with sufficient discretion to regulate differently the
abortion-clinic sort of hospital, taking into account for clinics of-
fering only pharmaceutical abortions, the different implications of
such a service with respect to the public interest in "health, hy-
giene, sanitation, construction and safety."'9 True, the Board can-
not avoid imposing on them what the statute does require, that
is, minimum standards for specified matters, viz:
(i) the construction and maintenance of hospitals, nursing homes
and certified nursing facilities to assure the environmental protec-
tion and the life safety of its patients, employees, and the public; (ii)
the operation, staffing and equipping of hospitals, nursing homes
and certified nursing facilities; (iii) qualifications and training of
staff of hospitals, nursing homes and certified nursing facilities, ex-
cept those professionals licensed or certified by the Department of
Health Professions; (iv) conditions under which a hospital or nursing
home may provide medical and nursing services to patients in their
places of residence; and (v) policies related to infection prevention,
disaster preparedness, and facility security.
2
0
On the other hand, the statute goes only so far and no further.
It does indeed command the Board to regulate all abortion clinics
as hospitals, but it does not insist that the Board regulate all
such clinics exactly the same, without regard to the sort of abor-
tions they make available, and thus, the sort of medical and envi-
ronmental risks they and their patients may run. Put simply,
even as amended by Bill 924, the Health Code does not oblige the
Board to regulate as if one size fit all. But that is what the Board
seems to have done. Emergency regulations2' adopted on Septem-
19. S.B. 924, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011) (enacted as Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch.
670, 2011 Va. Acts 1092, 1093). If the Board's counsel afforded such advice, the minutes of
the climactic meeting do not so reflect. See generally STATE BD. OF HEALTH MINUITES, sa-
pra note 16.
20. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
21. Those familiar with Virginia's Administrative Process Act ("APA") know to take
with a grain of salt the classification of these regulations as "emergency." In Virginia, a
rulemaking emergency can arise from nothing more than the impatience of the legislature.
These are emergency regulations because, in an uncodified section of Bill 924, the General
Assembly commanded the Board to promulgate implementing regulations within 280 days
of the bill's enactment. See S.B. 924. When the General Assembly is so inclined, it dis-
penses in this way with the ordinary public rights to timely notice and comment estab-
lished by the APA for agency rule making. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011(B) (Repl. Vol.
2011). Emergency regulations of this sort have force of law only for twelve months, during
which the promulgating agency may develop permanent replacements in accordance with
rulemaking procedures otherwise standard in the APA. See id. § 2.2-4011(C) (Rep]. Vol.
2011).
20121
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ber 16, 2011, made no distinction between clinics offering only
pharmaceutical abortions and those offering only surgical abor-
tions or both.22
Nor was such a distinction part of the rules proposed to follow
their emergency forerunners.22 That did not long forestall other
controversy about their legitimacy. In the same issue of the Vir-
ginia Register of Regulations in which were published the emer-
gency regulations, there also appeared a Notice of Intended Regu-
latory Action ("NOIRA")24 calling attention to the intent of the
Board to promulgate "Regulations for Licensure of Abortion Facil-
ities... to establish minimum standards for the licensure of facil-
ities that perform five or more first trimester abortions per
month." 5 The public was invited to comment within thirty days.6
Comment followed in "large volume."27
22. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-410-10 to -412 (2010 & Cum. Supp. 2012). The definition
of abortion embraces both pharmaceutical and surgical procedures, and the definition of
abortion clinic depends only on the number performed monthly, without regard to type.
Regulations for Licensure of Abortion Facilities (Emergency), 28 Va. Reg. Regs. 915 (Jan.
16, 2012) (to be codified at 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE).
23. VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, PROPOSED REGULATION AGENCY BACKGROUND DOCUMENT
6-7 (May 1, 2012), attached to STATE BD. OF HEALTH AGENDA (June 15, 2012),
http://www.vdh.state.va.us/Administration/meetings/documents/2012/pdf/June /2015%202
012%20BOH%20agenda.pdf (amending 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-410-10, -60 and adding
12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-412-10 to -370). Indeed, the director of the Health Department's
Office of Licensure and Certification advised the Board that 'Virginia law does not distin-
guish between medical and surgical abortions and thus, the Board of Health does not have
authority to do so." Id. at 12. This is hardly a self-evident proposition in light of the
Board's statutory authority to make law by regulation. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-12 (Repl.
Vol. 2011). Indeed, it runs contrary to generally accepted principles of agency rulemaking.
See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT A. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 29-30 (4th ed. 2011). However, it is consistent
with advice from the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia. According to Board meet-
ing minutes, "There was discussion concerning whether or not there are any facilities that
perform only medical abortions. [Senior Assistant Attorney General] Tysinger informed
the Board that from a legal perspective there is no distinction between medical and surgi-
cal abortions." STATE BD. OF HEALTH MINUTES, supra note 16, at 14. But there could be,
were the Board so inclined.
24. The APA generally requires an agency anticipating the promulgation of a rule to
solicit public participation in its drafting by publishing in the Virginia Register a Notice of
Intended Regulatory Action ("NOIRA"), and allowing at least thirty days for responses
thereto before filing proposed regulations with the registrar. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
4007.01 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
25. 28 Va. Reg. Regs. 803 (Jan. 16, 2012).
26. Id.
27. Memorandum from Erik Bodin, Director, Office for Licensure & Certification,
Proposed Regulations for Licensure of Abortion Clinics (12VAC5-412) (June 1, 2012), at-
tached to STATE BD. OF HEALTH AGENDA (June 15, 2012), supra note 23.
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At its quarterly meeting on June 15, 2012, the Board was pre-
sented by staff with a summary of the public comment stimulated
by the emergency regulations and the NOIRA,8 as well as a draft
of proposed abortion clinic regulations prepared by the Depart-
ment's Office of Licensure and Certification staff. 9 Unsurprising-
ly, under the circumstances, that draft substantially repeated the
terms of the emergency regulations they were intended to re-
place. 0
But the office draft was not adopted without debate and
amendment. As presented to the Board, the proposed regulations
would have obliged abortion clinics, as of the date the regulations
became effective, to comply with Guidelines for Design and Con-
struction of Health Care Facilities published in 2010 by the Facil-
ities Guidelines Institute. 1 During the meeting, an amendment
was tabled distinguishing clinics yet to be built from those al-
ready standing, postponing for two years from the effective date
of these regulations the deadline for compliance by the latter. 2
Discussion ensued, including advice from the attorney general
that such an amendment would be in violation of Virginia Code
section 32.1-127.001 and therefore beyond the scope of the
28. id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, PROPOSED REGULATION AGENCY BACKGROUND DOCUMENT
17 (Aug. 30, 2012), attached to STATE BD. OF HEALTH AGENDA (Sept. 14, 2012) http://www.
vdh.state.va.us/Administration/meetings/documents/2l2pdfSeptember%2014%202012%
20agenda.pdf. This draft of the minutes was approved without amendment at the Board's
following meeting on September 14, 2012. See STATE BD. OF HEALTH AGENDA (Sept. 14,
2012), supra. At one time, standards for the design and construction of health care facili-
ties were promulgated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services
pursuant to the Hospital Survey and Construction Act (Hill-Burton Act), which estab-
lished a program of federal grants and loan guarantees for hospital construction. Ch. 958,
60 Stat. 1040 (1946). When that program expired, volunteers attuned to the utility of uni-
form standards endeavored to preserve and maintain them unofficially and, under the ae-
gis of what is now the American Institute of Architects Academy of Architecture for
Health, formed the nonprofit Facilities Guidelines Institute for that purpose. See FACILITY
GUIDELINES INST., GUIDELINES FOR DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF HEALTH CARE
FACILITIES xiv-xv (2010).
32. STATE BD. OF HEALTH MINUTES 6 (June 15, 2012), http://www.vdh.state.
va.us/Administration/meetings/documents/2012/pdfMinutes/2OJune/2015/202012.pdf;
see VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, PROPOSED REGULATION AGENCY BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 17,
supra note 23. A similar amendment had been tabled unsuccessfully at the time the emer-
gency regulations were adopted. VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EMERGENCY REGULATION AND
NOIRA BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 6, attached to STATE BD. OF HEALTH AGENDA (Sept. 14,
2011), supra note 31.
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Board's rule making authority." Enacted in 2005, this section
charges the Board with promulgating regulations for hospitals
that "include minimum standards for the design and construction
of hospitals, nursing homes, and certified nursing facilities con-
sistent with the current edition of the Guidelines for Design and
Construction of Hospital and Health Care Facilities issued by the
American Institute of Architects Academy of Architecture for
Health." 4
From the meeting minutes, it appears that no explanation was
offered to the Board for the attorney general's view that the ta-
bled amendment was contrary to law. Even a casual reader ought
to notice in section 32.1-127.001 the absence of any limitation or
direction with reference to time or deadline. What the General
Assembly has not taken away in section 32.1-127.001 ought to be
presumed to remain. In the absence of explicit language to the
contrary, a reasonable interpretation of that section leaves intact
the general rulemaking discretion of the Board pursuant to sec-
tion 32.1-12, including the discretion to make distinctions and set
deadlines that are themselves reasonable. As it pertains to con-
struction and design, therefore, the tabled amendment ought to
be within the scope of the Board's discretion so long as it is both
reasonable and consistent with the guidelines. Assuming that the
expense of retrofitting established clinics can be substantial, to
the point of threatening the operation of some (as public comment
to the board averred),5 the amendment seems a reasonable ac-
commodation. It is hardly in conflict with the guidelines, which
are devoid of deadlines.
Having heard the attorney general's contrary advice, the Board
nevertheless voted seven to four to adopt the grace period
33. STATE BD. OF HEALTH MINUTES (June 15, 2012), supra note 32, at 7. The pertinent
part of Senate Bill 924 has been codified as:
Notwithstanding any law or regulation to the contrary, the Board of Health
shall promulgate regulations pursuant to § 32.1-127 for the licensure of hos-
pitals and nursing homes that shall include minimum standards for the de-
sign and construction of hospitals, nursing homes, and certified nursing facil-
ities consistent with the current edition of the Guidelines for Design and
Construction of Hospital and Health Care Facilities issued by the American
Institute of Architects Academy of Architecture for Health.
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.001 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.001 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
35. See VA. DEPT OF HEALTH, PROPOSED REGULATION AGENCY BACKGROUND
DOCUMENT 15 (Aug. 30, 2012), attached to STATE BD. OF HEALTH AGENDA (Sept. 14, 2012),
supra note 31.
[Vol. 47:7
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amendment. That was less an end to the controversy than a
trigger for its transmutation. Presented with proposed regula-
tions that included the amendment, the attorney general declined
to certify that they were in accordance with law, and the director
of the Health Department's Office of Governmental and Regulato-
ry Affairs then opined that, in the absence of such certification,
the office was without authority to convey the proposed regula-
tions to the Virginia Department of Planning and Budget for its
economic impact analysis in accordance with the Administrative
Process Act ("APA").7
This was enough to prompt the Board's chair to put reconsider-
ation of the amendment on the agenda for the next meeting.
Meanwhile, the attorney general reiterated his view that the
amendment was contrary to law, again without elucidating a ba-
sis for that view. 8 Instead, the attorney general warned the
Board that, if the amendment were not withdrawn in accordance
with his advice, the Board would run the risk that he might re-
fuse to defend them and their regulations in court:
As is the case with any state entity represented by the Office of the
Attorney General, Board members may refuse to follow the advice of
36. STATE BD. OF HEALTH MINUTES (June 15, 2012), supra note 32, at 6-8.
37. Memorandum from Joseph J. Hilbert, Director, Governmental and Regulatry Af-
fairs, to the State Board of Health, Proposed Regulations for the Licensure of Abortion Fa-
cilities (12 VAC5-412) 1-2 (Aug. 30, 2012), attached to STATE BD. OF HEALTH AGENDA
(Sept. 14, 2012), supra note 31; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4007.04 (Repl. Vol. 2011)
("Before delivering any proposed regulation under consideration to the Registrar as re-
quired in § 2.2-4007.05, the agency shall submit.., a copy of that regulation to the De-
partment of Planning and Budget. In addition to determining the public benefit, the De-
partment of Planning and Budget in coordination with the agency shall, within 45 days,
prepare an economic impact analysis of the proposed regulation .. "). According to Mr.
Hilbert, his hands were tied by Executive Order 14 (2010). That executive order responds
to Virginia Code section 2.2-4003, in which the General Assembly sets out its license for
executive department review of agency regulations. See generally Exec. Order No. 14
(2010) (June 29, 2010). Among other things, Executive Order 14 (2010) says what support-
ing information should accompany proposed regulations when they are conveyed to the
Department of Planning and Budget. Among the items required is "a memorandum from
the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) certifying that the agency has legal authority to
promulgate the regulation being proposed." Id. But Executive Order 14 (2010) does not say
anything at all about what should happen when an attorney general refuses such certifica-
tion. To the contrary, it clearly manifests the governor's intention not to interfere with the
process for rulemaking specified by statute, id., so the interpretation that it somehow dic-
tates suspension of that process is hardly a natural one. But this internecine conflict was
soon eclipsed and remains unresolved.
38. See Memorandum from Allyson K. Tysinger, Senior Assistant Att'y Gen., to Karen
Remly, Va. Dep't of Health, Regulations for Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia 12 VAC 5-
410-10 et seq. Regulations for Licensure of Abortion Facilities 12 VAC 5-412-10 et seq. (Ju-
ly 16, 2012) (on file with author).
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the Attorney General. Should a Board member choose to disregard
the Attorney General's advice and subsequently be named in a law-
suit related to the particular Board action taken, such as the recent
litigation challenging the certificate of public need program which
named every Board member as an individual defendant, the Attor-
ney General is not obligated to provide representation and it is with-
in the discretion of the Attorney General to decline both representa-
tion of the Board member and the appointment of special counsel.
Such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis. In a case where the
Office of the Attorney General declines to represent a Board member
because of the member's refusal to follow legal advice, it would be
the responsibility of the Board member to obtain and pay for his or
her own legal representation if representation was desired.39
The implications of this epistle are clear. Admitting that he
lacks the power to veto the regulations as amended, the attorney
general threatens to abandon his clients if they will not subordi-
nate their judgment to his.0 This threat, however, rests on as-
sumptions about the attorney general's power that are not
grounded in either statute or constitution.
In the first place, while the Virginia Constitution itself creates
the Office of Attorney General, it leaves to the General Assembly
discretion to specify the attorney general's duties. 1 That explicit
delegation ought to lead to a presumption against any claim of
inherent or implied powers attached to the office. It ought to fol-
low that the attorney general's duties and powers are to be found
in statute. It is true that the Virginia Code affords the attorney
general a monopoly of the market for legal services to state agen-
cies.42 But the same law that creates that monopoly ought to be
regarded as imposing a duty to furnish those services. Thus, Vir-
ginia Code section 2.2-507 ought to be interpreted as imposing on
the attorney general a duty to defend state agencies in civil cas-
es-except when statute excuses him. After all, if no such duty
were imposed by subsection 2.2-507(A), its two explicit exceptions
in subsection 2.2-507(C) would be meaningless. These allow the
attorney general to withhold his legal services when he finds it
either "uneconomical" or "impracticable" to provide them. By it-
39. Memorandum from Allyson K. Tysinger, Senior Assistant Att'y Gen., to Va. Bd. of
Health, Legal Representation of Board Members 2 (Sept. 12, 2012), attached to Julian
Walker, Cuccinelli Issues Warning Over Abortion Rules, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Sept. 13, 2012),
http:/lhamptonroads.com2012/09/cuccinelli-issues-warning-over-abortion-rules.
40. See id.
41. VA. CONST., art. V, § 15.
42. See VA. CODE ANN, § 2.2-507(A) (Supp. 2012).
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self, however, a lawyer's disagreement with a client's legal posi-
tion makes its defense neither uneconomical nor impracticable.
By the same token, in Virginia Code section 2.2-510, the General
Assembly has empowered the Governor to respond to situations
in which the attorney general is otherwise "unable" to serve his
client." But a lawyer's disagreement with a client's position hard-
ly renders him unable to defend it. An unstrained reading of both
sections therefore ought to lead to the conclusion that the attor-
ney general himself would be acting contrary to law were he to re-
fuse to defend simply because he disagrees."
This view of the scope of the attorney general's duty to defend
in accordance with statute allows a serious constitutional ques-
tion to be avoided. If his discretion to deny representation is so
broad as to encompass instances in which his only excuse is that
he disagrees with an agency's interpretation of its rule making
power, then separation of executive and law making powers is far
less than it appears. Article III of the Virginia Constitution man-
dates the separation of executive and legislative powers and au-
thorizes the General Assembly to create and empower adminis-
trative agencies. 5 The attorney general has conceded that he is
without power to veto a regulation by the Board, even when he
considers it ultra vires." His predecessor long ago recognized that
an agency's rule making is part of legislative power.47 If the attor-
ney general is right that, by authority conferred in an executive
order, he can stay agency rule making with which he disagrees,
then he enjoys in fact what he has been denied by law. By the
same token, if he can intimidate his rulemaking client, then he
enjoys in fact power to dictate rules that he is denied by law. It
43. Id. § 2.2-510(4) (Supp. 2012). Or when clients at odds create a conflict of interest
that would make representation of both "improper," see id., a situation neither ripe nor to
be ruled out in this controversy.
44. See id. §§ 2.2-507(C), -510(1) to -510(4) (Supp. 2012). Moreover, both section 2.2-
507(C) and section 2.2-510(1) prescribe what ought to follow the attorney general's with-
drawal. See id. §§ 2.2-507(C), -510(1) (Supp. 2012). Neither leaves the client defenseless;
both contemplate the enlistment of alternative counsel at the client's expense. See id.
When the attorney general does not defend, the law calls for a substitute.
45. VA. CONsr. art. III, § 1; cf. Winchester & Strasburg R.R. v. Commonwealth, 106
Va. 264, 268, 55 S.E. 692, 693 (1906) ("[T]he whole power of one of these departments
should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the
other departments, but that either department may exercise the powers of another to a
limited extent."), quoted in Baliles v. Mazur, 224 Va. 462, 471-72, 297 S.E.2d 695, 700
(1982).
46. Memorandum from Allyson K. Tysinger to Va. Bd. of Health, supra note 39.
47. 1981-82 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 93, 93-94, 95.
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might be ventured that this imbalance of executive and legisla-
tive powers is only as serious as the threat is effective. Effective-
ness is hard to measure, but the fact remains that in the face of
such gestures as are herein described, the Board withdrew the
grace period amendment. The stage is now set for another
transformation of the controversy, into a civil action in court.
When the Board, unbidden by the General Assembly, promul-
gates regulations that subject clinics offering only non-surgical
abortions to standards appropriate for clinics offering surgical
abortions, or imposes on existing facilities an early deadline for
compliance with construction standards intended for new pro-
jects, that judgment is apt for judicial review.9 The Health Code
is clear that the Board's issuance of a variance or exception may
be ultra vires if it is not reasonable;50 the code is far less clear
that withholding a variance or exception is unlawful when its is-
sue would be reasonable. The federal Administrative Procedure
Act,51 governing most federal agencies delegated rulemaking pow-
er of the sort here in question, empowers a federal court to hold
unlawful and set aside agency action the court finds "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
48. Trevor Baratko, Abortion Providers Must Meet New Hospital Codes, Board of
Health Dicatates, LOUDOUNTIMES (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.loudountimes.com/index.
php/news/article/41369; Jim Nolan, Cuccinelli OKs New Clinic Regulations; Tighter Rules
for Abortion Providers Now Go to Governor for His Review, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept.
27, 2012, at B04.
49. Rulemaking by the Board is subject to the APA. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-24 (Repl.
Vol. 2011). According to the APA:
Any person affected by and claiming the unlawfulness of any regulation...
shall have a right to the direct review thereof by an appropriate and timely
court action against the agency or its officers or agents in the manner provid-
ed by the rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Actions may be instituted in
any court of competent jurisdiction as provided in § 2.2-4003, and the judg-
ments of the courts of original jurisdiction shall be subject to appeal to or re-
view by higher courts as in other cases unless otherwise provided by law. In
addition, when any regulation or case decision is the subject of an enforce-
ment action in court, it shall also be reviewable by the court as a defense to
the action, and the judgment or decree therein shall be appealable as in other
cases.
Id. § 2.2-4026 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
50. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-12 (Repl. Vol. 2011) ("The Board may make, adopt,
promulgate and enforce such regulations and provide for reasonable variances and exemp-
tions therefrom .... ) (emphasis added).
51. Act of June 11, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 551-59, 701-06,
1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C. (1946)).
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with law."52 The correlative section of the Virginia APA, governing
the Board in this instance, is less specific. It empowers a Com-
monwealth court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action not
in accordance with law," but it does not explicitly empower the
court to set aside agency action simply because the court finds the
agency action arbitrary and capricious. 4 A reviewing Common-
wealth court would first have to be persuaded to find material dif-
ferences between pharmaceutical and medical abortions, or be-
tween existing and planned facilities." It would then have to be
persuaded that those material differences make regulating both
types by the same standards arbitrary and capricious. Only then
52. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). According to the Supreme Court of the United States,
a federal court reviewing agency action under section 706
is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within the scope of his
authority. This determination naturally begins with a delineation of the
scope of the Secretary's authority and discretion. As has been shown, Con-
gress has specified only a small range of choices that the Secretary can make.
Also involved in this initial inquiry is a determination of whether on the facts
the Secretary's decision can reasonably be said to be within that range. The
reviewing court must consider whether the Secretary properly construed his
authority . A.. -nd the reviewing court must be able to find that the Secre-
tary could have reasonably believed that in this case there are no feasible al-
ternatives or that alternatives do involve unique problems,
Scrutiny of the facts does not end, however, with the determination that
the Secretary has acted within the scope of his statutory authority. Section
706 (2)(A) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not em-
powered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971) (citations
omitted).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4027 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
54. There is plenty of evidence to support an observation that Commonwealth courts
consider themselves empowered by Virginia's APA to set aside case decisions by state
agencies on the grounds that they are arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Petersburg Hosp.
Co. v. Remley, No. 0052-11-2 2012, Va. App. LEXIS 55, at *14 (February 28, 2012) (un-
published decision) (quoting Loudoun Hosp. Ctr. v. Stroube, 50 Va. App. 478, 491, 650
S.E.2d 879, 886 (2007)) ('"[W]here... the issue concerns an agency decision based on the
proper application of its expert discretion, the reviewing court will not substitute its own
independent judgment for that of the agency but rather will reverse the agency decision
only if that decision was arbitrary and capricious"'). The author has yet to unearth a re-
port that a Commonwealth court has set aside an agency's legislative rule or regulation by
reference to the state APA on the stated grounds that, because the agency action is arbi-
trary and capricious, it must not be in accordance with law.
55. To be material in this context, differences ought to relate to "health, hygiene, sani-
tation, construction and safety," to which the Board's attention has been explicitly directed
by the legislature. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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would the court be in a position to answer the Zen question of
whether an unreasonable agency regulation can ever be in "ac-
cordance with law."
Virginia's APA otherwise empowers a Commonwealth court to
set aside agency action that violates a "constitutional right, pow-
er, privilege, or immunity."6 Potentially at risk from these regu-
lations is a pregnant woman's federal constitutional right to an
abortion.57 As a constitutional right, her right to abortion is a lib-
erty interest of the sort protected by due process," which trans-
lates into immunity from arbitrary and capricious government ac-
tion." Even after setting to one side the obvious due process issue
of whether these regulations unduly burden women attempting to
exercise this particular constitutional right,0 there remains ap-
purtenant to the Board's rulemaking decision another due process
issue: whether the Board's decision not to regulate different pro-
cedures or facilities differently is unconstitutional because it is
arbitrary and capricious.
But if a court were somehow to conclude, as has the attorney
general, that in Bill 924 the General Assembly in fact stripped
the Board of discretion to treat pharmaceutical abortion clinics
differently in its regulations, or to afford a period of grace for ex-
isting clinics, then surely the regulations now in effect and pro-
posed would be in accordance with law, however arbitrary and
56. Id. § 2.2-4027 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
57. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (striking down a state law
criminalizing partial-birth abortion); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 887, 893 95 (1992) (striking down a state law conditioning abortion on spousal con-
sent).
58. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 839 (4th ed. 2011).
59. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1980) (quoting Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)) ("[The] guaranty of due process, as has often been
held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to
be attained."). In Nebbia, the Court, per Justice Roberts, went on to say, "It results that a
regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for an-
other sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonable-
ness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts." 291 U.S. at 525. Judgments that
state regulations violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they are unconstitutionally
arbitrary and capricious are few and far between, presumably because legislatures and
agencies tend not to act that way very often, especially under public scrutiny. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58, at 694-95 (describing a handful of cases in which the Su-
preme Court invalidated laws for want of a rational basis.)
60. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58.
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capricious it otherwise might be to treat unlike cases alike.6' As
subsequent and more specific legislation, Bill 924 would be pre-
sumed preemptive of older, more general sections of the Health
Code with which it conflicts, including the part of section 32.1
that limits the Board to making only regulations that are reason-
able.
Time will tell.
2. Excluding Firearms by Regulation: Banned if You Do; Banned
if You Don't
The authority of Virginia's state agencies with general rule
making authority to ban firearms within their jurisdictions has
been in dispute for more than a decade. It arose years before the
Supreme Court of the United States confirmed a constitutional
right to possess firearms free of prohibition by either federal or
state law.62 Several of Virginia's attorneys general have opined on
the matter, offering guidance of one sort or the other.63 In 2011,
the Supreme Court of Virginia seemed to settle much of the ques-
tion.
In 2002, in response to a query by Delegate Black, Attorney
General Earley issued an official opinion that a regulation" by
the Department of Conservation and Recreation ("DCR") prohibit.
ing concealed carriage of firearms in state parks could be enforced
against a gunman with a concealed weapons permit.65 In Attorney
61. While nothing on the face of the amendment makes this clear, surely nothing in
the legislative history shows any attention by legislatures to the distinction. If facial in-
terpretation of the amendment is abandoned for extrinsic evidence, that evidence will dis-
favor judicial implementation of such a distinction.
62. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.s. 570, 599-600 (2007); see also McDon-
ald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
63. '"While [the attorney general's opinion is] entitled to due consideration, fit is] not
binding on this Court."' Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton, 255 Va. 387, 393, 497 S.E.2d 858,
861 (1998) (quoting City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Rest. Ass'n, 231 Va. 130, 135, 341
S.E.2d 198, 201 (1986)) (second alteration in original).
64. VA. ADmiN. CODE § 5-30-200 (2005).
65. 2001 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 102, 103. Concealed carriage of firearms generally is pro-
hibited in the Commonwealth and the first offense qualifies as a Class 1 misdemeanor. VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(A) (Cum. Supp. 2012). This general prohibition, however, is subject
to a number of exceptions based on circumstance or status. See id. § 18.2-308(B)-(C) (Cum.
Supp. 2012). Moreover, the general prohibition does not inhibit adults with concealed car-
riage permits issued in Virginia. Id. § 18.2-308(D) (Cum. Supp. 2012). Such permits gen-
erally are available but foreclosed for a few, like fugitives and addicts, disqualified in the
statute. id. § 18.2-308(E) (Cum. Supp. 2012). But a carry permit falls short of carte
20121
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
General Earley's view, because the statute creating the permit
explicitly limited its scope to places where firearms were not
"otherwise prohibited by law," such a permit was ineffective in
places covered by the DCR's regulation." This syllogism rested on
a premise of two parts: that an administrative regulation was a
law within the meaning of the permit statute and that the DCR
was empowered to promulgate a firearms ban in the form of a
• 67
regulation. The first gave the attorney general no pause," nor
should it have. The DCR is empowered to make rules in accord-
ance with the APA,69 and that statute makes it clear such regula-
tions have force of law.7" The terse provision in title 18.2 limiting
carriage in accordance with the permit to places where firearms
were not otherwise prohibited by law affords no reason to doubt
that its drafters regarded regulations as laws. As for the second
part of his premise, the attorney general apparently saw no rea-
son to infer an implicit exception from otherwise general lan-
guage endowing the DCR to make whatever rules were necessary
or incidental to the management of state parks.7' Indeed, he
found the DCR "clearly and unambiguously" empowered to make
such a rule.2
Only a year (and a regime change) later, Attorney General Kil-
gore opined to the contrary, in response to another query by Del-
egate Black, finding the same regulation ultra vires."3 In Attorney
General Kilgore's view, the various limits to the carry permit set
forth in statute are to be read as exclusive.7 ' In other words, what
the General Assembly did not enumerate, no agency could.7 5
blanche. It does not "authorize the possession of any handgun or other weapon on property
or in places where such possession is otherwise prohibited by law or is prohibited by the
owner of private property." Id. § 18.2-308(0) (Cum. Supp. 2012). Among the places where
such possession is otherwise prohibited are the buildings and grounds of schools elemen-
tary, middle, and secondary. Id. § 18.2-308.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
66. 2001 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. at 103.
67. Id. at 102-03.
68. Id. at 102.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-104(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
70. Id. § 2.2-4001 (Repl. Vol, 2011 & Supp. 2012).
71. 2001 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. at 103.
72. Id.
73. Compare id., with 2002 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 34, 37.
74. 2002 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. at 36-37.
75. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (i.e., the inclusion of one thing indicates the
exclusion of the other). E.g., United States v. Cottingham, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 615, 627 (1843).
Attorney General Kilgore offered no reason for presuming that the enumerated list in his
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Hitherto, the question had been whether the DCR could ban
from parks firearms carried in concealment by those with carry
permits. More recently, in 2008, in response to a query by Dele-
gate Cuccinelli, Attorney General McDonnell opined that the
DCR was without authority to ban from parks firearms carried
openly." Embracing the logic employed by Attorney General Kil-
gore, Attorney General McDonnell pointed to the only statutory
provision on the subject, which banned assault rifles from parks
in eight cities and five counties, and concluded that it must be
taken as the final word on the matter, leaving no opportunity for
the DCR to exercise its rule-making authority.77
In DiGiacinto v. George Mason University, an occasional visitor
sued George Mason University ("GMU") in the Fairfax County
Circuit Court, attacking GMU's regulation prohibiting entry with
a firearm into specified university buildings and attendance with
a firearm at certain sorts of university events. s He argued that
the regulation unconstitutionally interfered with firearm rights
he enjoyed under both the Second Amendment of the United
States Constitution8 and article I, section 13 of the Virginia Con-
stitution."0 He also argued that GMU was otherwise without au-
thority to promulgate such a regulation." His complaint was dis-
missed. 2 When he appealed, the supreme court affirmed, making
short shrift of his constitutional claims 3 and agreeing with the
contemplation should be taken as the outer boundary rather than an irreducible core. Im-
plicit in the prior decision of Attorney General Earley is his presumption that the list in
section 18.2-308(0) leaves open to subordinate lawmakers the option of addition, if not
subtraction. As for the contrary opinion of his immediate predecessor, Attorney General
Kilgore explained that it had dealt only with whether the regulation was law, not whether
the DCR had any authority to promulgate it. 2002 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. at 38 n.39.
76. 2008 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 12, 12.
77. Compare id. at 14 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-287.4 (Supp. 2008)), with 2002 Op.
Va. Att'y Gen. at 36-37.
78. 281 Va. 127, 130-31, 704 S.E.2d 365, 367 (2011); cf. 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 35-60-20
(2010) ("Possession or carrying of any weapon by any person, except a police officer, is pro-
hibited on university property in academic buildings, administrative office buildings, stu-
dent residence buildings, dining facilities, or while attending sporting, entertainment or
educational events. Entry upon the aforementioned university property in violation of this
prohibition is expressly forbidden.").
79. As incorporated in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. Chicago,
561 U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
80. DiGiacinto, 281 Va. at 132, 204 S.E.2d at 368.
81. Id. at 131, 704 S.E.2d at 367.
82. Id. at 132, 704 S.E.2d at 368.
83. As the Supreme Court of Virginia noted, the Supreme Court of the United States'
recent decisions explicitly recognizing a constitutional right to possess and carry firearms
have gone only so far and have left intact laws forbidding the carrying of weapons into
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court below that GMU had authority to promulgate a prohibition
of firearms as broad in scope as GMU's actual regulation. ' As far
as the court was concerned, when the General Assembly con-
ferred on GMU's Board of Directors the power to make "all need-
ful rules and regulations concerning the University," that general
delegation of rulemaking authority encompassed "regulations...
that promote safety on GMU's campus." 5 Taking note that the
prohibition was not general, that is, it left open the carriage to
campus of firearms in other circumstances, the court sustained
the regulation. 6
Six months later, in response to a query from Senator Hanger,
Attorney General Cuccinelli offered his opinion that the Universi-
ty of Virginia ("UVA") could prohibit the open carriage of firearms
on campus by publishing a policy, but could not, simply by pub-
lishing a policy, prohibit the concealed carriage of firearms by
those generally licensed for such carriage.87 In his view, even if a
policy can serve to effectuate a prohibition, that does not make it
law, and the general license for concealed carriage is subject to
limitation only by law.88 Perhaps chastened, UVA soon promul-
gated the same norm as a regulation. 9
What the supreme court had to say about the scope of a univer-
sity's authority to ban firearms by regulations with force of law
ought to hold true in equal measure for state agencies with gen-
eral authority to make within their respective jurisdictions law in
the form of regulations. DiGiacinto offered the court an oppor-
tunity to insist that only specific delegation of authority to make
rules about firearms can suffice. The court went in a different di-
schools and other sensitive places. Id. at 134-35, 704 S.E.2d at 369 (citing District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008); McDonald, 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at
3047). The Supreme Court of Virginia was not disposed to find in article I section 13 of the
Virginia Constitution anything different in this regard, declaring that firearms rights in
section 13 are coextensive with those found in the United States Constitution's Second
Amendment. Id. at 133, 704 S.E.2d at 368.
84. Id. at 139, 704 S.E.2d at 372.
85. Id. at 136, 704 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 23-91.29(a) (Repl. Vol.
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at 136-37, 139, 704 S.E.2d at 370, 372.
87. Op. to Hon. Emmett W. Hanger, Jr. (July 1, 2011). Senator Hanger inquired about
Policy SEC-30. Id. Apparently, SEC-30 had been on the books since 2009. See Policy: Reg-
ulation of Weapons, Fireworks and Explosives, UNiv. OF VA. (Dec. 12, 2011),
https://policy.itc.virginia.edu/policy/policydisplay?id=SEC030. The version in question was
superseded on December 13, 2011. Id.
88. Op. to Hon. Emmett W. Hanger, Jr. (July 1, 2011); cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
308(0) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
89. 8 VA. ADMiN. CODE § 85-20-10 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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rection, and the incumbent attorney general has since opined in
harmony."
When it comes to banning firearms, interesting questions about
the meaning of statutes with regard to rulemaking power may
now be more or less settled for the state agencies of Virginia, in
particular her colleges and universities, but troublesome constitu-
tional questions remain open. More precise measurements of
what the two constitutions permit any lawmaker so inclined must
await another day. It ought not to go unnoticed that in DiGiacinto
the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld GMU's ban by reference to
dicta in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amend-
ment does not per se rule out bans in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings.91 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia put GMU within that class both because it is an educational
institution according to Virginia law and because its property be-
longs to the Commonwealth.92 Another court might have taken
notice, as did Attorney General McDonnell,' of the General As-
sembly's distinction when it comes to firearms between schools
primary, middle, and high on the one hand, and other places of
learning, such as colleges and universities. 4 When the Supreme
Court of the United States gave notice in Heller that firearms
could still be banned in schools and government buildings, it did
not define its terms.
Another constitutional question left open relates to the scope of
the ban. After DiGiacinto, a ban of the breadth of GMU's has the
sanction of that precedent, but any broader ban is still in jeop-
ardy. In his opinion for Senator Hanger, Attorney General Cucci-
nelli distinguished on this basis the ban by UVA from the ban by
GMU upheld in DiGiacinto.5 Just how short of absolute a campus
ban can be and still pass constitutional muster as a "tailored" ban
remains to be seen. Stay tuned.
90. Compare DiGiacinto, 281 Va. at 134-35, 139, 704 S.E.2d at 369, 372 (quoting Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2007)), with Op. to Hon. Emmett W.
Hanger, Jr. (July 1, 2011).
91. 281 Va. at 134-35, 704 S.E.2d at 369 (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. -,
__, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010)).
92. See id. at 135, 704 S.E.2d at 369.
93. 2008 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 12, 14.
94. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
95. Op. to Hon. Emmett W. Hanger, Jr. (July 1, 2011).
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3. Judicial Review of Agency Action
a. What Is Arbitrary and Capricious?
By law, Virginia offers education in its public colleges and uni-
versities in exchange for tuition and guarantees Virginians a low-
er rate.96 By the terms of the statute, the educational institutions
involved assess student applications for the lower, in-state rate,
and decide contested cases, subject to judicial review.97 In Virgin-
ia Commonwealth University v. Su, the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia put an end to whatever confusion there might have been as to
the standard for its review of circuit court decisions in such cases,
and gave a lesson to the circuit courts regarding the standard of
review for such cases when before them.98
Su, a native of China, applied from Minnesota for admission to
several universities around the country, including Virginia Com-
monwealth University ("VCU"), which afforded him admission.99
After a year, he applied for recognition of a domicile change and
in-state tuition.' He had been living with his uncle in Midlothi-
an, had worked part-time in two local restaurants, and had
changed his driver's license, vehicle title, and registration.' Dur-
ing recess, he had returned to China for a month. 2 A university
hearing officer rejected his application on the grounds that his F-
1 visa prohibited change in his domicile.0 3 He appealed to VCU's
Residency Appeals Committee, which took evidence that he had
established permanent residency before matriculating. At that
hearing, Su said he would "probably" remain in the Common-
wealth after graduation.' VCU refused him in-state status.'6
The committee denied his application, finding that he had failed
to offer clear and convincing evidence that rebutted the statutory
presumption that he is in Virginia "primarily for educational
96. See VA. CODEANN. §§ 23-7.4, -7.4:2 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
97. Id. § 23-7.4:3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
98. See 283 Va. 446, 451-52, 722 S.E.2d 561, 563 (2012).
99. Id. at 449-50, 722 S.E.2d at 562.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 450-51, 722 S.E.2d at 563.
103. Id. at 450, 722 S.E.2d at 562.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 451, 722 S.E.2d at 563.
106. See id.
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purposes.""7 Su appealed to the Richmond City Circuit Court,
which reversed after finding VCU's decision arbitrary and capri-
cious.0 8 VCU appealed, and the supreme court reversed, finding
that the court below had erred in demanding more than the or-
ganic law required of VCU, in concentrating on the wrong admin-
istrative decision, and in accepting and relying on evidence ex-
trinsic to VCU's record.'09 Along the way, the court stipulated that
its standard of review in such a case is de novo, notwithstanding
language in two prior decisions that seemed to call for a "plainly
wrong" standard."0 Turning from its review to that by the court
below, the supreme court noted that the tuition statute directed
the circuit court in such cases to determine whether VCU's deci-
sion had been arbitrary and capricious or otherwise contrary to
law. 1' According to the court, a decision is arbitrary and capri-
cious when it is "willful and unreasonable, and taken without
consideration or in disregard of facts or law or without determin-
ing principle.""' In this case, the circuit court erred in reweighing
the evidence for itself."' As interpreted by the supreme court, the
107. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 454-55, 722 S.E.2d at 565.
110. Compare id. at 451-52, 722 S.E.2d at 563, with George Mason Univ. v. Floyd, 275
Va. 32, 39, 654 S.E.2d 556, 559 (2008), and Ravindranathan v. Va. Commonwealth Univ.,
258 Va. 269, 275, 519 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1999).
111. Su, 283 Va. at 455, 722 S.E.2d at 565 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 23-7.4:3(A) (Repl.
Vol. 2011)).
112. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. Westcott, 254 Va. 218, 224, 492 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1997) (quot-
ing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (re-
versing circuit court's judgment that board's decision to fire a security guard was arbitrary
and capricious). In the view of the supreme court, apparently, what arbitrary and capri-
cious means as a standard of review is common to both state university decisions refusing
in-state tuition and local school board decisions to terminate a school security guard for
excessive absenteeism. See Sit, 283 Va. at 453, 722 S.E.2d at 564 (citing Westcott, 254 Va.
at 224, 492 S.E.2d at 150). Thus, the meaning is sufficiently elastic to span judicial review
for conformity of judgments by both state agencies and school boards with either statutory
or constitutional norms. At least in cases in which the definition of the phrase is undisput-
ed, the supreme court tacitly presumes that its law dictionary meaning was intended by
the drafters of both a 1996 statute, Act of April 17, 1996, ch. 931, 1996 Acts 2240, 2246
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 23-7.4:3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996)); Act of Apr. 17,
1996, ch. 981, 1996 Va. Acts 2404, 2410 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 23-
7.4:3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996)), where it is explicitly set forth, and the 1971 Virginia Consti-
tution, article XIII, section 7, where it has been found implicitly present. See Westcott, 254
Va. at 222, 492 S.E.2d at 148 (quoting Bristol Va. Sch. Bd. v. Quarles, 235 Va. 108, 119,
366 S.E.2d 82, 89 (1988)). Yet the phrase is not to be found at all in the revised fourth edi-
tion. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (4th ed. 1968). It first appears in the fifth. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979); cf. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN
WONDERLAND 58 (Richard Kelly ed. 2000) ("Curioser and curioser!').
113. Su, 283 Va. at 455, 722 S.E.2d at 565.
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tuition statute does not allow a circuit court to substitute its
judgment for that of the university. 114
B. Timing of Review
In Russell v. Board of Agriculture and Consumer Services, the
Virginia Court of Appeals gave meaning to the word "adoption" as
it appears in Rule of the Supreme Court of Virginia 2A:2, making
clear the starting point for measuring the ensuing window in
which those opposed may file notice of appeal.116 According to the
rule:
Any party appealing from a regulation or case decision shall file with
the agency secretary, within 30 days after adoption of the regulation
or after service of the final order in the case decision, a notice of ap-
peal signed by the appealing party or that party's counsel. In the
event that a case decision is required by § 2.2-4023 or by any other
provision of law to be served by mail upon a party, 3 days shall be
added to the 30-day period for that party. Service under this Rule
shall be sufficient if sent by registered or certified mail to the party's
last address known to the agency.116
This case arose when the Board of Agriculture and Consumer
Services on March 20, 2008, adopted, as amended after notice and
comment, proposed regulations bringing Virginia into line with
standards of the United States Department of Agriculture de-
signed to combat scrapie in sheep and goats."7 The state regula-
tions, with an effective date of October 30, 2008, appeared in the
August 18, 2008, issue of Register of Regulations. 8 On October
30, 2008, Kathryn Russell served the Board of Agriculture and
Consumer Services with notice of appeal; she then filed a petition
for appeal in the Albemarle County Circuit Court."9 The Board of
Agriculture and Consumer Services moved successfully for dis-
missal on the grounds that service of the notice of appeal had not
been timely per Rule 2A:2. 2' Before the circuit court could rule,
the plaintiff died, and her husband was substituted. 2' He eventu-
114. Id.
115. 59 Va. App. 86, 87-88, 717 S.E.2d 413, 413-14 (2011).
116. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 2, R. 2A:2(a) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
117. Russell, 59 Va. App. at 89-90, 717 S.E.2d at 414.
118. Id., 717 S.E.2d at 414-15.
119. Id. at 90, 717 S.E.2d at 415.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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ally appealed on various grounds, one of which was that the no-
tice of appeal had been timely.122 The court of appeals disagreed
on this point, and then declined to rule on his other assignments
of error for want of jurisdiction."'2 According to the court of ap-
peals, procedural due process considerations and an interest in
limiting judicial review to agency action that is final persuades
interpreting "adoption" in Rule 2A:2 as the point in time not
when the Board of Agriculture and Consumer Services adopts its
final version and forwards it to the registrar, but when the "[thir-
ty-]day 'final adoption period"' of Virginia Code section 2.2-
4013(D) comes to an end, that is, when time runs out on the gov-
ernor's discretion to suspend the newly published regulation.2 4
For the regulations in question, that occurred on September 17,
2008, the late Mrs. Russell's notice was untimely, and the circuit
court properly dismissed her appeal on that ground. 125 Without
jurisdiction, the lower court could not decide other assignments of
error (including a claim that the regulation was void ab initio for
want of jurisdiction on the part of the Board of Agriculture and
Consumer Services).12 6 Without error in the court below, the court
of appeals could not either. 127
It would not be unreasonable to project the deadline for giving
notice of appeal from the date on which the regulations were to
become effective, as Mrs. Russell may have assumed, but that
measure would be contrary to the plain language of Rule 2A:2,
however that rule's trigger of "adoption" might be interpreted.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN VIRGINIA'S FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Virginia Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") was enacted
by the General Assembly in 1968,12s two years after Congress en-
acted the federal Freedom of Information Act.129 Much like the
federal FOIA, the Virginia FOIA was created to grant citizens
122. See id.
123. See id. at 90, 95, 717 S.E.2d at 415, 417.
124. See id. at 93, 717 S.E.2d at 416.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 95, 717 S.E.2d at 417.
127. Id.
128. Act of Apr. 4, 1968, ch. 479, 1968 Acts 690, 691-93; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-
3700 to -3714 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
129. Compare id., with Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89.554, 80 Stat. 383
(1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV. 2010)).
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greater access to public records 30 The guiding principle of FOIA
is the presumption of openness."' It rejects an "atmosphere of se-
crecy" and affords citizens "every opportunity.., to witness the
operations of government."'' Under FOIA, citizens may: (i) in-
spect and/or receive copies of public records; (ii) obtain in advance
an estimate of any charges that may apply; and, if necessary, (iii)
file a petition in district or circuit court to compel compliance
when their rights under the act have been violated.'33
Since its enactment, FOIA has been revised every year to ad-
dress changing circumstances and public concerns. 34 In 2010 and
2011, the General Assembly made several such revisions. A total
of twelve bills were passed in 2010, six of which created four new
records exemptions. 3' Twenty bills were passed in 2011, two of
which created two more new records exemptions."6 Each session
also added one new closed meeting exemption.'37 The bills also
amended several existing provisions of FOIA." Some of these
changes merit discussion; notice of all of them must be taken by
public bodies and officials.'39
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
131. Id. ("All public records and meetings shall be presumed open, unless an exemption
is properly invoked."); see VA. MUN. LEAGUE, VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT,
VIRGINIA CONFLICT OF INTEREST ACT AND THE VIRGINIA PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 3 (Aug.
2012), available at http:l/www.vml.org/CLAY/SeriesPDF/1 1-12FOIACOIA.pdf [hereinafter
VML 2011 GUIDE] ("The guiding principle of FOIA is openness.").
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
133. The Rights of Requesters and the Responsibilities of the Department of Accounts
under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, VA. DEP'T OF ACCTS., http:// www.doa.virg
inia.gov/GeneralDOA/FOIA.cfm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
134. VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 3.
135. VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 2010 FOIA LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 1
(2010), available at http://foiacouncil.dls.virginia.gov/2010updt.pdf [hereinafter 2010
UPDATE]. Established by the General Assembly, the Virginia Freedom of Information Ad-
visory Council is an advisory organ in the legislative branch with a mandate to encourage
compliance with the act. VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE
VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADVISORY COUNCIL 1 (2010), available at http://foia
council.dls.virginia.gov/20loar.pdf [hereinafter 2010 REPORT]. "As directed by statute, the
Council is tasked with furnishing advisory opinions concerning FOIA upon the request of
any person or agency of state or local government," as well as "conducting training semi-
nars and educational programs for the members and staff of public bodies and other inter-
ested persons on the requirements of FOIA." Id. (footnote omitted).
136. VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 2011 FOIA LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 1
(June 2, 2011), available at http://foiacouncil.dls.virginia.gov/2Olupdt.pdf [hereinafter
2011 UPDATE].
137. 2010 UPDATE, supra note 135, at 1; 2011 UPDATE, supra note 136, at 1.
138. 2010 UPDATE, supra note 135, at 2; 2011 UPDATE, supra note 136, at 2.
139. Compare 2011 UPDATE, supra note 136, at 1-3, with VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700(B)
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A. Requests for Public Records
The majority of state open records laws are modeled after the
federal FOIA.140 Although interpretations of the federal FOLA may
inform interpretation of Virginia's FOTA, there are important dif-
ferences between the two. Moreover, certain records that would
be subject to a FOIA request in some states may not be in others.
Some states may consider certain entities to be public bodies,
while others may determine that the analogous entities in their
states are not. Hence, one cannot rely exclusively upon interpre-
tations of the federal FOIA, or of another state's FOJA, when in-
terpreting Virginia's FOIA.
Because FOLA grants access to public records,' the first order
of business is to define what constitutes a "public record." As en-
acted, FOIA provided access to official records until 1999, when
the Act was amended by substitution of the term "public" for "of-
ficial.' 42 As the Virginia Press Association explained at the time,
the purpose of this change was to remind public bodies that gov-
ernment records belong to the citizens, hence the public.' 3 The
word "public" also was regarded as broader by definition than "of-
ficial" and, therefore, seen as better serving the purpose of the
Act by helping "public officials understand ... that any form of
information storage constitutes a public record."'
From 2001 to 2011, the definition of "public records" remained
the same. They were defined as:
all writings and recordings that consist of letters, words or numbers,
or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostatting, photography, magnetic impulse, optical or magneto-
(Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012) ("All public bodies and their officers and employees shall
make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with a requester concerning the production
of the records requested.").
140. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Consti-
tution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002) ("Today, all fifty states have open records stat-
utes, a majority of which are modeled after the [federal] FOIA.").
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012) ("Tihe General As-
sembly ensures the people of the Commonwealth ready access to public records.
(emphasis added).
142. Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 703, 1999 Va. Acts 1149, 1151-52; Act of Mar. 28, 1999,
ch. 726, 1999 Va. Acts 1218, 1220.
143. Letter from Ginger Stanley, Exec. Dir., Va. Press Ass'n, to Joint Subcomm. Study-
ing Va.'s Freedom of Info. Act (Aug. 17, 1998) in RPT. OF THE JOINT SUBCOMM. STUDYING
VA.'S FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT, H. Doc. No. 106, at B-50, B-52 (2000).
144. Id. at B-52, B-53 (emphasis added).
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optical form, mechanical or electronic recording or other form of data
compilation, however stored, and regardless of physical form or
characteristics, prepared or owned by, or in the possession of a public
body or its officers, employees or agents in the transaction of public
business. 145
In 2011, the General Assembly added the following sentence:
"Records that are not prepared for or used in the transaction of
public business are not public records. 146 In this way, the General
Assembly slightly narrowed the definition of public records.
Afterwards, the town of Saltville encountered a FOIA request
obliging it to grapple with the question of what may be considered
"transaction of public business. 14 '7 The town applied to the Smyth
County Circuit Court for a declaratory judgment as to which, if
any, of the records requested were subject to the Act. 14 As "trans-
action of public business" is not expressly defined in FOIA, it is
widely accepted that whether a record qualifies must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.'49 A number of documents were
submitted by the town under seal; at least two were not.' 50 The
court reviewed each and found that "[s]ome deal with the transac-
tion of town business and some are totally personal and are not
subject to disclosure under [FOIA].""' Although the opinion does
not describe the contents of the documents, the court stated that
nine of the communications contained matters related to the
transaction of public business and, thus, were subject to disclo-
sure under FOIA.15' However, the court ordered redaction of por-
tions of the documents that it found purely personal.'
As illustrated by Saltville, when a public body is uncertain
whether records are public or private, it may apply for judicial
guidance.' Alternatively, it may consult the Virginia Freedom of
145. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3701 (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. (Cum. Supp. 2010).
146. Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 242, 2011 Acts 371 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-3701 (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
147. Town of Saltville v. Surber, No. CL1l-100, 20i1 Va. Cir. LEXIS 219, at *1 (Cir. Ct.
Aug. 24, 2011) (Smyth County) (unpublished decision).
148. Id. at*1-2.
149. See Advisory Op. Freedom Info. Advisory Council AO-04-10 (Nov. 19, 2010), avail-
able at http://foiacouncil.dls.virginia.gov/ops/O/AO 04 10.htm.
150. Saltville, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 219, at *2, *5.
151. Town of Saltville v. Surrber, 83 Va. Cir. 161, 162 (2011) (Smyth County).
152. Saltvile, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 219, at *4.
153. See id.
154. See id. at *1-2
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Information Advisory Council ("FOI Advisory Council").155 The
General Assembly established the council to encourage and facili-
tate compliance with FOIA.' 56 Moreover, when members of the
public have questions regarding FOIA, they too can direct them
to the council, which issues advisory opinions in written form as
well as over the phone or by email.5 7 Past advisory opinions can
be found on the council's website.55 The Virginia Office of the At-
torney General also issues opinions interpreting FOIA."' Alt-
hough opinions of the FOI Advisory Council and the attorney
general are non-binding, in the view of the Virginia Coalition for
Open Government, they provide well-reasoned guidance and are
potentially persuasive to Virginia's courts.'60
In Burton v. Mann, the Loudoun County Circuit Court con-
fronted the question of what constitutes a proper response when
the custodian believes the records requested do not arise in the
transaction of public business and therefore are not public rec-
ords.' A landowner had made FOIA requests to both a member
and the chairman of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors.' 2
In a timely fashion, the member furnished some of the e-mails re-
quested but withheld others after concluding that they were not
related to the transaction of public business and, therefore, not
155. VA, CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704.1 (Repl. Vol. 2011); id. § 30-179 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
156. Id. § 30-178 (Repl. Vol, 2011); see VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL
(August 15, 2000), available at http://foiacouncil.dls.virginia.gov/sm08150O.htm.
157. VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL, ADVISORY OPINIONS, http://foiacouncil.
dls.virginia.gov/Services/opinions.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012),
158. VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL, SERVICES OF THE COUNCIL, http://foia
council.dls.virginia.gov/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
159. VA. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV'T, ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://www.opengovva.org/foi-
opinions/attorney-general-opinions-mainmenu-63 (last visited Oct. 15, 2012); see John F.
O'Connor & Michael J. Baratz, Some Assembly Required: The Application of State Open
Meeting Laws to E-mail Correspondence, 12 CEO. MASON L. REV. 719, 743 (2004) (citing
Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161, 300 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1983))
("[llt is a settled doctrine of Virginia law that the construction of a Virginia statute by the
Attorney General is entitled to deference by Virginia courts.").
160. VA. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV'T, LOOK UP OPINIONS, http://www.opengovva.orgfoi-
opinions (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). Formed in 1996, the coalition is a nonprofit alliance
promoting expanded access to government records, meetings and other proceedings at the
state and local level. VA. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV'T, ABOUT THE COALITION,
http://www.opengovva.org/about-us/about-us (last visited Oct. 15, 2012). It admits doing
some lobbying, but avers that its primary work is educational. Id. Its board of directors
includes librarians, genealogists, broadcasters, journalists, as well as access and transpar-
ency activists. Id.
161. 74 Va. Cir. 471, 471 (2008) (Loudoun County).
162. Id. at 472.
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subject to disclosure.'63 The court ruled that the member's re-
sponse was legally insufficient.
1 4
According to the statute, when a FOIA request is received, the
custodian has five days to respond in one of five ways: 6 ' (i) pro-
vide the records, 6' (ii) withhold all of the records requested and
identify with reasonable particularity their subject matter,6 7 (iii)
withhold some of them and identify with reasonable particularity
the subject matter of those withheld,' 6 (iv) inform the requesting
party that the records do not exist or cannot be found,' 6 or (v)
give notice that responding finally will take longer than five days
and explain why (which extends the custodian's deadline another
seven days).7 ' According to the statute, the custodian's failure to
respond is to be treated as a denial of the request.'71 In Burton,
the question for the court was whether the board member re-
sponded sufficiently."' Noting that the statute is silent as to what
suffices as a proper response in such circumstances,' the court
articulated three rules. First, the recipient of the request has to
determine if it calls for communications "arising out of the course
of the public business of the recipient" as opposed to communica-
tions that are private.7 4 Once that determination is made, the re-
163. Id. at 475; see also VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 9 ("E-mails have generat-
ed much controversy since they began being used in government business operation. E-
mails that deal with public business are public records."); Advisory Op. Va. Freedom of
Info. Advisory Council A0-1-00 (Sept. 29, 2000) available at http://foiacouncil.dls.virgi
nia.gov/ops/00/AO-l.htm ("It is... the subject of those e-mails that determines their sta-
tus as public records.").
164. Burton, 74 Va. Cir. at 478.
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012); see also Fenter v.
Norfolk Airport Auth., 274 Va. 524, 532, 649 S.E.2d 704, 709 (2007) (holding that the Nor-
folk Airport Authority had violated FOIA by failing to properly respond to Fenter's re-
quests); Advisory Op. Va. Freedom of Info. Advisory Council AO-07-11 (Nov. 9, 2011),
available at http://fiacouncil.dls.virgi nia.gov/opsll/AO-07_11. Htm.
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
167. Id. § 2.2-3704(B)(1).
168. Id. § 2.2-3704(B)(2).
169. Id. § 2.2-3704(B)(3).
170. Id. § 2.2-3704(B)(4).
171. Id. § 2.2-3704(E) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
172. 74 Va. Cir. 471, 471 (2008) (Loudoun County).
173. Id. at 478.
174. Id. at 479. The Burton court seems to have thought that information in the custo-
dy of a public official could fall only into one of two categories: (i) matters arising in the
course of public business or (ii) private matters. Thus, one may presume that a record that
does not arise in the course of public business must be a private matter. However, the
2011 amendments added the following category: "Records that are not prepared for or
used in the transaction of public business." Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 242, 2011 Acts 371,
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cipient then can deny production of records that are indeed pri-
vate. 1 5 But the recipient's response must inform the requestor
that requested communications are being withheld because they
are private and "describe the nature of the record not produced or
disclosed in a manner that ... will enable the party making the
request and the Court to assess whether or not the record was
prepared in the transaction of public business."'76 As the member
of the board of supervisors had simply withheld the records with-
out explaining why, the court found his response inadequate.
1 7
The court's rules seem reasonable. Because the General As-
sembly has afforded a frustrated requestor the option of judicial
review of a custodian's denial, it should be presumed that the leg-
islature intended that any denial be accompanied by explanation
sufficient to allow the requestor to accept it gracefully, or else
seek a second opinion, and in that event, to allow a court to pro-
nounce the custodian's judgment in accordance with law or oth-
erwise. Moreover, there is both a public interest in how custodi-
ans respond and a legislative interest in how executives enforce.
Those interests also are served by obliging custodians to articu-
late to requestors their reasons for denial. An interpretation of
the statute to the contrary-that is, one sustaining FOIA denials
without explanation-would surely be less efficient in the long
run. But the rule herein imposed is not without drawback. A re-
quest for data that is seen as private by its custodian now puts
that custodian between a rock and a hard place. There is a reason
why the most popular response among those in the public eye is
"no comment." At least in Loudoun County, refusal of a FOIA re-
371 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3701 (Repl. Vol. 2011)). Hence, when a
record does not arise in the course of public business, that does not automatically make it
private.
175. Burton, 74 Va. Cir. at 479. "In Virginia, records about public business are subject
to FOIA, whether they are kept on personal or government computers, or using personal
or government email accounts." VA. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV'T, LIGHT TOUCH FOR FOLA IN
2011, http://www.opengovva.org/newsletter/april-2011/1521-light-touch-for-foia-in-2011
(last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
176. Burton, 79 Va. Cir. at 479. In determining whether a record is related to the
transaction of public business, the Loudoun County Circuit Court stated that "[w]hether a
record is found in a public databank, or one privately contracted for by the officer, agent,
or employee of a public body is not determinative." Id. at 474; see also Kansas City Star
Co. v. Fulson, 859 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993) ("Public business encompasses
those matters over which the public governmental body has supervision, control, jurisdic-
tion or advisory power.").
177. Burton, 74 Va. Cir. at 479.
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quest must be accompanied by notice that the custodian considers
the data private-and why.17' From now on, there will be a penal-
ty for failure."' The custodian of data that contains the private in-
formation of others must find some means of describing the data
that will satisfy a reviewing court that refusal was for a good
enough reason, without revealing the secrets of others and violat-
ing any duty of confidentiality owed them.
Responding to FOIA requests is a responsibility that lies with
the custodian of the records."' If one public official does not have
the records but knows that another does, the non-custodian must
respond by providing contact information for the custodian rather
than denying a request altogether.18' The 2010 and 2011 revisions
mandate that if a public body archives records, it is its responsi-
bility to retrieve requested records from storage. 8 2 This, however,
does not apply when records have been permanently archived at
the Library of Virginia, which becomes the custodian of such rec-
ords. 8' It is important to note that the responsibility of respond-
ing to a FOIA request lies with the individual custodian and not
the institutional custodian.' 4 However, the institution may be
named as a defendant if a violation occurs and the requestor files
suit."'
B. The Citizenship Debate
According to Virginia's FOIA, only citizens of the Common-
wealth are entitled to access its public records.' 8 Only a few other
178. Id.
179. "No civil penalty shall be assessed, as the actions of [the custodian in this case]
were not willful, they being upon advise [sic] of counsel or subject to the rule adopted this
date." Id.
180. VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 9.
181. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
182. Act of Mar. 25, 2011, ch. 604, 2011 Acts 986, 987 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-3704(J) (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(J) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
184. VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 9.
185. Id.
186. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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states have imposed such a restriction.187 Virginia's FOIA pro-
vides that:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all public records
shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizens of the Com-
monwealth during the regular office hours of the custodian of such
records. Access to such records shall not be denied to citizens of the
Commonwealth, representatives of newspapers and magazines with
circulation in the Commonwealth, and representatives of radio and
television stations broadcasting in or into the Commonwealth."'8
Recently, this restriction was called into question. In 2006, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a
judgment that such a restriction in Delaware's FOIA violated the
United States Constitution. In Lee v. Minner, the plaintiff, a citi-
zen of New York, had requested from various state officials rec-
ords regarding Delaware's decision to join a nationwide settle-
ment with a lending company, Household International, Inc.,
which was to resolve an investigation into the company's decep-
tive lending practices. 8' His requests were referred to the state
solicitor, who denied them on the grounds that only Delaware cit-
izens could make such requests.' When Lee sued for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief on the grounds that this re-
striction violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article
IV, Section 4, the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware agreed and granted him summary judgment."' With re-
sort to a three-prong test set forth by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Toomer v. Witsell,"'5 the court found that the re-
striction impermissibly interfered with Lee's right as a journalist
to be on equal footing with the journalists of Delaware, as well as
187. The states (other than Virginia) that allow only their citizens' requests for public
records are Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Tennessee.
See ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (Cum. Supp. 2011) (stating that all "citizens" have a right to ac.
cess Alabama's public records but not indicating whether it means citizens of Alabama or
citizens of the United States); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2011); GA. CODE
ANN. § 50-18-70(b) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (Cum. Supp. 2011) (indicating
that all "citizens" have a right to access New Hampshire's public records but not clarifying
whether this includes only citizens of New Hampshire or citizens of the United States);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2011). In light of the Third Circuit's ruling in
Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2006), New Jersey's citizen-only restriction will be-
come invalid. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 (2003).
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012) (emphasis added).
189. 485 F.3d 194, 195 (3d Cir. 2006), affing 369 F. Supp. 2d 527 (D. Del. 2005).
190. Lee, 485 F.3d at 195-96.
191. Lee, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
192. 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
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with his right under the clause to "engage in the political process
with regard to matters of both national political and economic
importance."19' The district court went on to hold that, while Del-
aware's interest in shaping its own political community was suffi-
ciently important to warrant interference with rights of the sort
claimed by Lee, the citizen-only limit did not substantially serve
that interest.
194
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, adopting the district
court's reasoning with respect to Lee's right to engage as an out-
sider in the political process.'" In support of the proposition that
such an interest enjoyed the protection of the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause, the court of appeals invoked its decision in
Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey.'96 In that
case, the court sustained certain professional requirements im-
posed on noncitizen members of the New Jersey bar."' Having
held the citizen-only limit unconstitutional on this basis, the
court of appeals in Lee v. Minner declined to rule on the alterna-
tive holding by the district court that the limit impermissibly in-
hibited Lee's right to engage in the common calling of journalism
on equal footing with Delaware journalists. 98
Lee v. Minner was the principal precedent invoked recently by
plaintiffs challenging the citizen-only limit in Virginia's FOIA.'99
McBurney, a citizen of Rhode Island pursuing child support pay-
ments from a Virginian, applied for assistance from the Virginia
Department of Child Support Services.' Eventually, by reference
to FOIA, he requested records pertaining to his case.' The de-
partment denied his request on two grounds: first, that the docu-
ments were private records not subject to FOIA and second, that
193. Lee, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (quoting John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S.
146, 152 (1989) ("[Tl]he basic purpose of the [federal] FOIA is to ensure an informed citi-
zenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption
and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.") (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
194. Id. at 535.
195. Lee, 458 F.3d at 195.
196. Id. at 200 (citing Tolchin v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., il1 F.3d 1099, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997)).
197. Tolchin, 111 F.3d at 1102.
198. 458 F.3d at 198-99.
199. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 780 F. Supp. 2d 439, 448 (E.D. Va. 2011).
200. Id. at 443.
201. Id.
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he was not a Virginia citizen."' Meanwhile, Hurlburt, a citizen of
California, invoked FOIA when requesting records of tax assess-
ments from Henrico County, and Stewart, a citizen of West Vir-
ginia, applied to Virginia Tech for records relating to the compen-
sation of senior officials, including the University's president."'
These requests also were refused on the grounds that the reques-
tors were not Virginia citizens.2 4 McBurney, Hurlburt, and Stew-
art all sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, asking for declaratory judgments and injunc-
tive relief."' Their cases were consolidated, and then summarily
dismissed."0 Stewart's suit was dismissed after the court deter-
mined that the attorney general of Virginia, the only defendant
against whom she had proceeded, was not a proper defendant."'
She did not appeal."8 McBurney, Hurlburt, and Stewart appealed
from the district court's dismissal of their claims on the grounds
that they lacked standing.0 ' On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld
Stewart's dismissal but found that both McBurney and Hurlburt
had standing sufficient for their claims to be heard and remanded
for decision on the merits.2"'
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants after determining that neither McBurney nor
Hurlburt had suffered an injury to an interest protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 1 McBurney had suggested
that among the rights guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2 was the
right to advocate one's own case.212 Hurlburt had suggested a
right to do business on an equal footing with Virginia citizens in
competition. 211 Judge Spencer found neither among the collection
of rights protected by the clause." ' In McBurney's case, Judge
Spencer drew a distinction between the right well-established
202. Id.
203. McBurney v. Mims, No. 3:09-CV-44, 2009 WL 1209037, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 1,
2009).
204. Id.
205. Id. at *1.
206. Id. at *l, *7.
207. Id. at *4.
208. See MeBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 396 (4th Cir. 2010).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 404.
211. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 780 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446-47, 453 (E.D. Va. 2011).
212. Id at 449-50.
213. Id. at 450.
214. Id.
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under Article IV, Section 2 to equal access to the courts and
MeBurney's putative right to equal convenience in advocating for
his own interest.215 With respect to equal access to the courts of
Virginia, were McBurney to file an action as a suitor from else-
where, he would be entitled to the same discovery as a suitor
from the Commonwealth.21 ' In Hurlburt's case, Judge Spencer
drew a distinction between the right well established under Arti-
cle IV, Section 2 to engage in a common calling free of unequal
state regulation and Hurlburt's putative right to suffer no incon-
venience unknown to his Virginia competitors. 17
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed."8 The court of appeals
agreed with the court below that what is protected by Article IV,
Section 2 is the right to pursue a common calling, not a right to
more generally pursue one's economic interest."9 Reserving Vir-
ginia's FOIA access to Virginians does not prejudice an outsider's
protected pursuit of a common calling; it may affect it indirectly,
but that does not rise to the level of a violation of Article IV, Sec-
tion 2.2 In the view of the court of appeals, a general right of ac-
cess to a state's records "simply does not 'bear a upon the vitality
of the Nation as a single entity' such that VFOIA's citizen-only
provision implicates the Privileges and Immunities Clause."
Turning to Lee v. Minner, the Fourth Circuit observed that the
right to "to engage in the political process with regard to matters
of both national political and economic importance," on which
that case was based, has not been found by the Supreme Court
among the fundamental rights covered by Article IV, Section 2,
and anyway was not implicated by the claims of either plaintiff in
this case.2 2
Called upon to assess the constitutionality of reserving state
FOIA access for forum citizens, two federal circuits have now tak-
215. Id. at 449.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 447.
218. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 470 (4th Cir. 2012).
219. Id. at 464-65.
220. See id. at 463-64.
221. Id. at 466 (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978))
(alteration in original).
222. Id. at 465-67 (quoting Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2006)). As for the
dormant Commerce Clause objection, because Virginia's FOIA cannot be regarded as eco-
nomic regulation, it cannot run afoul of the clause. Id. at 469-70.
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en Article IV, Section 2 in different directions. Appreciative of the
important role transparency can play in improving government,
the Third Circuit ventured to the edge of the envelope of public
interests that may persuade preemption of state limits on federal
constitutional grounds.2 Unsurprisingly, the Fourth Circuit was
unwilling to follow, that is, to blaze a constitutional trail in ad-
vance of the Supreme Court of the United States. For at least the
near future, therefore, access to information in the custody of
Virginia government is limited legally to citizens of the Com-
monwealth and, practically, to those outsiders who can engage
citizens of the Commonwealth for their research."2 A petition by
McBurney and Hurlburt for writ of certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court of the United States on October 5, 2012.225 The
Court called for briefing on the question of whether Article IV,
Section 2 and the dormant Commerce Clause allow a state to de-
ny citizens of other states the same right of access to public rec-
ords that the state affords its own citizens.2 '
It should be noted that it is fairly common for public bodies to
honor out-of-state requests, even when they are not required to
by law. ' In the coalition's view, because the citizenship re-
striction does not entirely prevent a noncitizen from accessing
Virginia's public records, denying his or her request on that basis
"seems to be saying no just for the sake of saying no."2
223. See Lee, 458 F.3d at 200.
224. 2010 REPORT, supra note 135, at 5.
225. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. granted 81 U.S.L.W. 3193
(U.S. Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 12-17).
226. Id.
227. 2010 REPORT, supra note 135, 5-6. In 2010, the Virginia FOI Advisory Council
appointed the Rights and Remedies Subcommittee to study House Bill 641, which sought
to expand the right to make FOIA requests in Virginia to noncitizens of the state. Id. at 2-
5. Several representatives commented that their respective agencies usually honor out-of-
state requests. Id. at 5 ("Council member Spencer agreed and stated that she handles nu-
merous out-of-state FOIA requests on behalf of the Virginia State Bar daily. She stated
that most of these requests are from data aggregators and she successfully negotiates a
deal with them on their requests. The State Bar usually honors out-of-state requests, but
if the records requested are voluminous, they charge for their production. Other state
agencies also commented on their experience with out-of-state requests. A representative
of the Department of Medical Assistance Services (DMAS) indicated that DMAS never de-
nied a FOIA request based on citizenship. However, because the number of requests be-
came overwhelming, DMAS began charging for the production of the requested records. A
representative of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) states that DMV usually hon-
ors out-of-state requests and it is not a big problem for them. VDOT indicated that they
also honor out-of-state requests unless the requested records are voluminous.").
228. VA. COAL. POR OPEN GOV'T, VIRGINIAS CITIZEN-ONLY FOIA LIMITATION (July 8,
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At the time of the council's report to the General Assembly, the
McBurney case was still unresolved.22 Therefore, the council de-
cided to postpone any recommendations until the Fourth Circuit
had reached a decision, and, thus, "it was agreed that HB641 as
referred to the Council [would] not go forward.""23 But now that
the Fourth Circuit has spoken, it will be interesting to see what
other arguments proponents of open government come up with to
expand FOIA to include noncitizens. One such argument is that
"[p]eople who do not live in Virginia can have legitimate concerns
about what Virginia government does. If they are willing to pay
for the records like anyone else, government should turn them
over."23' Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, and Tennessee are the only states that currently have a citi-
zenship-based restriction on FOIA access.232 Perhaps Virginia will
soon follow the majority. As Megan Rhyne, executive director for
the Virginia Coalition for Open Government puts it, "We should
open our records up to everyone, if for no other reason than to
remind everyone else why Virginia is a special place.""23
C. Enforcement
When a citizen suspects that a public official or public body has
violated FOJA, he or she may file suit under section 2.2-3713 of
the act. 34 The 2010 revisions allow for such an action to be
brought in the name of an individual even when the original
FOIA request was made by the individual's attorney in a repre-
sentative capacity, and not by the individual himself.35 The 2011
revisions require that the petition be received (by the party it is
2010), http://www.opengovva.org/foi-blog-list/1403-virginias-citizens-only-foia-limitation.
229. 2010 REPORT, supra note 135, at 5.
230. Id. at 6.
231. Editorial, Widen Access to Public Records, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 28, 2011, at A13.
232. See supra note 187.
233. VA. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV'T, VIRGINIA'S CITIZEN-ONLY FOJIA LIMITATION, supra
note 228.
234. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3173(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
235. Act of Apr. 9, 2010, ch. 299, 2010 Va. Acts 421, 422 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3713(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
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brought against) at least three business days before it is filed."'
Once filed, it must be heard within seven days."7
The General Assembly also made a significant change to the
violations and penalties section by doubling both the minimum
and maximum civil penalties for willful and knowing violations.23
This change came after UVA denied the existence of records relat-
ing to climate scientist Michael Mann. 3' Delegate Marshall, who
sponsored this bill, made a FOIA request to UVA, which UVA de-
nied.24 UVA later relented and released thousands of pages of
emails after the American Tradition Institute ("ATI") requested
judicial assistance in bringing the school into compliance with
FOIA.241 Delegate Marshall introduced the bill because he consid-
ered inadequate the penalty then available.242 Previously, the civil
penalties ranged from $250 to $1000. 24 3 After the 2011 amend-
ment, they now range from $500 to $2000.14' For subsequent vio-
lations, the fines now range from $2000 to $5000, whereas previ-
ously, they ranged from $1000 to $2500.245 These penalties are
paid into the Literary Fund. 4 The Violations and Penalties sec-
tion also was amended to clarify that the civil penalties may be
imposed on officers and employees of public bodies as well.247
236. Act of Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 133, 2011 Va. Acts 216, 216-17 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3713(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011)); Act of Apr. 6, 2011, ch. 783, 2011 Va. Acts
1311, 1312 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3713(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
237. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3713(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
238. Act of Mar. 22, 2011, ch. 327, 2011 Va. Acts 453, 453 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3714 (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
239. ATI Praises Va. House Passage of Strengthened FOJA Law, AM. TRADITION INST.
(Feb. 9, 2011), http:/www.atinstitute.org/ati-praises-va-house-passage-of-strengthened-
foia-law/ [hereinafter ATI].
240. Paige Winfield Cunningham, Marshall Wants FOIA Changes, DAILY PRESS, Jan.
23, 2011, at A9.
241. Christopher C. Homer, UVA Goes All-in on Climate Gate FOLA Coverup, AM.
TRADITION INST. (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www.atinstitute.org/atis-horner-uva-goes-all-in-on-
climategate-foia-cover-up/.
242. ATI, supra note 239.
243. Id.
244. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3714 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
245. Compare id., with id. (Repl. Vol. 2008).
246. Id. (Repl. Vol. 2011).
247. Act of Mar. 22, 2011, ch. 327, 2011 Va. Acts 453, 453 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3714 (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
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Although FOIA authorizes penalties, judges rarely impose
them. In past cases, a penalty was imposed only twice, and at
least one of them was overturned on appeal.24 One may presume
that by increasing the amounts, the legislature has signaled its
expectation that penalties will be imposed. It will be interesting
to see if penalties are imposed more often after this.
As the law now stands, the only way to enforce FOIA is with a
lawsuit.24 Advocates of open government have argued for alterna-
tive enforcement vehicles that are less costly and less time-
consuming.25 Some states, such as Kentucky, Nebraska, and
Georgia, empower their attorney general to investigate and re-
solve FOIA disputes.5 1 In Virginia, although the attorney general
may issue opinions about FOIA compliance, he is not authorized
to investigate or to make binding decisions.252 Some proponents of
open government have suggested that the FOI Advisory Council
should have authority to investigate FOIA violations. 3 The coun-
cil handles thousands of FOIA inquiries, issues opinions, studies
changes to FOIA, and trains government officials on compli-
ance."4 Nevertheless, it lacks enforcement authority.255 On the
other hand, FOIA requires courts to hear FOA cases within sev-
en days of filing.256 This places a strain on dockets; indeed, Satur-
day hearings are commonplace in FOIA cases.257 Moreover, since
FOIA cases are heard in general district and circuit courts, FOIA
sometimes is interpreted differently in different parts of the
state.5 Given that the FOI Advisory Council is the organization
most knowledgeable on FOIA matters, it makes sense that it
248. VA. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV'T, LIGHT TOUCH FOR FOIA IN 2011, supra note 175. Com-
pare VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2.3714 (Repl. Vol. 2011), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.56.550
(West Cum. Supp. 2012) (allowing the courts in Washington state to award plaintiffs one
hundred dollars for each day their request is denied wrongfully).
249. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3713 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
250. See. e.g., Megan Rhyne, The Power to Enforce FOLA, VA. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV'T,
http://www.opengovva.org/newsletter/january-2012/1568-the-power-to-enforce-foia (last
visited Oct. 15, 2012) [hereinafter POWER TO ENFORCE FOIA].
251. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.880 (Repl. Vol. 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-712.03
(Cum. Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-73(A) (2009).
252. POWER TO ENFORCE FOIA, supra note 250.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3713(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
257. VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 14.
258. POWER TO ENFORCE FOIA, supra note 250.
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should have enforcement authority, even if it is only to mediate
FOJA disputes.
D. New Exemptions
The policy underlying FOJA is to ensure "the people of the
Commonwealth ready access to public records in the custody of a
public body or its officers and employees, and free entry to meet-
ings of public bodies wherein the business of the people is being
conducted." '259 To further this objective, the act goes on to say
"This chapter shall be liberally construed to promote an increased
awareness by all persons of governmental activities and afford
every opportunity to citizens to witness the operations of govern-
ment." However, this policy of "ready access" and "increased
awareness" is not absolute, and the General Assembly has identi-
fied instances in which certain information is exempt from man-
datory disclosure.61
FOIA currently has more than one hundred exemptions... for
disclosing records, organized in different sections of the statute.2 63
The federal FOIA has only nine.264 Several of the exemptions in
FOIA are only applicable to specific agencies while others are
more generally applicable.2" Just because an exemption is availa-
ble does not mean the public body has to apply it.266 Public bodies
are charged to use their discretion and construe exemptions nar-
rowly in order to ensure that nothing which ought to be public is
kept hidden.67 Furthermore, it is the public body that "bear[s] the
burden of proof to establish an exemption by a preponderance of
the evidence. 269
259. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
260. Id.
261. Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 242 Va. 219, 224, 409 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1991).
262. FOIA Exemptions of General Applicability, VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY
COUNCIL, http://foiacouncil.dls.virginia.gov/Applicability Exemptions/GeneralExempt
ions.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
263. VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 11.
264. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
265. FOT Citizens' Guide, VA. COAL. FOR OPEN GOV'T, http:I/www.opengovva.org/virgin
ias-foia-resources (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
266. Id.
267. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
268. Id. § 2.2-3713(E) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012)
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The act provides for "record exemptions," which incorporate the
types of records that are exempt from disclosure, and also "closed
meeting exemptions" that allow for the discussion of exempt rec-
ords to take place in closed meetings from which the public is ex-
cluded.269
1. Meetings
FOIA provides a broad definition of "meeting" so as to include
every type that involves public business." ' Location is usually ir-
relevant so that even if a council meets outside its chambers, at a
private retreat, it is still considered a meeting as long as public
business is discussed.271 FOIA requires proper notice of a meet-
ing."' There are specific notice requirements depending on the
type of public business to be discussed.2 7 In general, the public
body is required to provide the "date, time, and location of its
meetings by placing the notice in a prominent public loca-
tion . ,, ." The Act also requires that the notice be posted in the
public body's clerk's office or in the office of the chief administra-
tor, as well as by electronic means, such as the public body's web-
site or electronic calendar.7 Public bodies also are required to
permit citizens to record, videotape, and photograph meetings.276
Therefore, a public body may not hold a meeting at a location
where recordings are prohibited, such as a courtroom.277
All meetings of public bodies are required to be open to the
public unless an exemption applies. 8 The General Assembly add-
ed one new closed-meeting exemption in the 2010 session, which
corresponds to one of the records exemptions. This exemption al-
lows public bodies to hold closed meetings for the discussion or
269. VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 6, 9.
270. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3701 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
271. VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 4.
272. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3707(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
273. See VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 5.
274. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3707(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
275. Id.
276. Id. § 2.2-3707(H) (Repl. Vol, 2011 & Supp. 2012).
277. VML 2011 GUIDE, supra note 131, at 5.
278. Id. at 3.
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consideration of certain exempt records of the Virginia Tobacco
Indemnification and Community Revitalization Commission.279
In the 2011 session, the General Assembly added a closed
meeting exemption for the discussion by the Commercial Space
Flight Authority (the "Authority") of records relating to rate
structures or charges for using the facilities of the Authority, the
public disclosure of which would adversely affect its financial in-
280terest or bargaining position.
2. Records Exemptions
The General Assembly passed six bills creating four new record
exemptions in the 2010 session.' One of them excludes from the
mandatory disclosure provisions of FOIA records that are submit-
ted as part of a grant application including trade secrets and cer-
tain proprietary records disclosed to, provided to, or held by the
Virginia Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization
Commission.2 2 Other record exemptions added in the 2010 ses-
sion included exemptions for (i) certain records of threat assess-
ment teams at public institutions of higher education related to
specific individuals,283 (ii) certain records related to the Statewide
Agencies Radio System and similar communications systems,2 4
and (iii) financial account numbers and routing information from
mandatory disclosure.'
In the 2011 session, the General Assembly added two new rec-
ord exemptions.286 The first creates an exemption from the man-
279. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3711(A)(44) (Supp. 2012).
280. Act of Mar. 25, 2011, ch. 541, 2011 Va. Acts 851, 857 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3711(A)(45) (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
281. 2010 UPDATE, supra note 135, at 1.
282. Act of Apr. 9, 2010, ch. 310, 2010 Va. Acts 438, 443 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.6(23) (Cum. Supp. 2010)); Act of Apr. 21, 2010, ch. 808, 2010 Va.
Acts 1693, 1699 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.6(23) (Cum. Supp.
2010)).
283. Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 456, 2010 Va. Acts 832, 833 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.4(8) (Cum. Supp. 2010)); Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 524, 2010 Va. Acts
969, 970 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.4(8) (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
284. Act of Apr. 12, 2010, ch. 672, 2010 Va. Acts 1210, 1212 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.2(14) (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
285. Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 553, 2010 Va. Acts 1016, 1017 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.1(13) (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
286. Act of Mar. 25, 2011, ch. 541, 2011 Va. Acts 851, 852 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.6(24) (Repl. Vol. 2011)); Act of Apr. 6, 2011, ch. 781, 2011 Va. Acts
1305, 1308 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.6(25) (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
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datory disclosure requirements of FOIA for records of the Com-
mercial Space Flight Authority relating to rate structures or
charges for using the facilities of the Authority if public disclosure
would adversely affect its financial interest or bargaining posi-
tion. 7 It also exempts records the Authority receives from a pri-
vate entity when such records contain
(i) trade secrets of the private entity as defined in the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (§ 59.1-336 et seq.);
(ii) financial records of the private entity, including balance sheets
and financial statements, that are not generally available to the pub-
lic through regulatory disclosure or otherwise; or
(iii) other information submitted by the private entity, where, if the
records were made public, the financial interest or bargaining posi-
tion of the Authority or private entity would be adversely affected.
2
88
The second new record exemption created in 2011 provided for
an exemption for documents and records of a proprietary nature
provided by an agricultural landowner or operator as part of a
219
state or federal regulatory enforcement action.
By allowing for exemptions, the General Assembly recognizes
"that the best interests of the Commonwealth may require that
certain governmental records and activities not be subject to
compelled disclosure., 290 Nevertheless, open government advo-
cates claim that "the General Assembly has whittled away" at
FOIA by adding new exemptions each year.291 FOIA may appear
to have too many exemptions, but many of them only apply to
specific agencies, and, as the statute clearly states, exemptions
are to be narrowly construed so as not to undermine the policy of
292
open government.
One subject that is still under investigation by the Virginia
FOIA Advisory Council is access to criminal and other law-
enforcement records.2 93 Based on the recommendation of the
Criminal Investigative Records Subcommittee, the council decid-
287. Ch. 541, 2011 Acts at 852.
288. Id.
289. Ch. 781, 2011 Acts 1308.
290. Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 242 Va. 219, 224, 409 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1991).
291. Editorial, Virginia's Many Secrecy Excuses, ROANOKE TIMES, Mar. 24, 2011, at
A14.
292. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
293. VA. FREEDOM OF INFO. ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ADVIsORY COUNCIL 4 (2011), available at http:/foiacouncil.dls.virginia.gov/
201 lar.pdfOpenDocument.
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ed not to make any changes to the existing exemption for criminal
investigative records, but the subcommittee will continue to study
the issues in 2012 due to the level of "interest in access to crimi-
nal investigative files and other law enforcement records. 294
294. Id.
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